Section 302 (b) (1) (B)
American With Disabilities Act
[g]oods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations shall be afforded to an individual with a disability in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual. This section is intended to remove second-class status from those with disabilities by requiring that they be "mainstream" to extent in the provision of goods, services, etc., from a public accommodation.

Section 302 (b) (1) (C)
American With Disabilities Act,
prohibit excluding and segregating persons with disabilities based on 'among things, presumptions, patronizing, attitudes, fears, and stereotypes....'

Section 302 (b) (1) (D)
American With Disabilities Act
warns covered entities that they 'shall not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize standards or criteria or methods of administration (1) that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability; or (2) that perpetuate the discriminating of others who are subject to common administrative control.' which indicates that it 'incorporates a disparate impact standard to ensure the legislative mandate to end discrimination does not ring hollow.'

Section 302 (b) (1) (E)
American With Disabilities Act
covered entities are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of association. This section bars public accommodations from excluding or denying "equal goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, or other opportunities to individual or entity because of the known disability of an individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association resulting in the denial of opportunity.

Enforcement-
Courts are given broad powers to remedy violations of title III of the Civil Right of 1964 including the authority to assess civil penalties against those who violate its provisions. These include individual preventive and injunctive relief.

Section 308 (a) (1)
American With Disabilities Act,
imports to Title III the remedies and procedures from Section 204 (A) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.SC2000a-3(A) and are available to persons who are being discriminated against on the basic of their disability of who have reasonable grounds to believe that they are the subjects of discrimination. Under this section, one need not actually suffer before seeking redress if it is clear that a person or organization covered by Title III does not intend to comply with its provisions. Section 204 (A) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows a civil action for "preventive relief" which may include an application for temporary, preliminary, or permanent injunctive relief. The Attorney General may intervene in cases of public importance brought by private parties.

For tons of free resources and just plain good reading, visit John Felts personal page that includes his pages, published articles, essays.
http://felts.freespaces.com

ASWAN vs. City of Richmond,

ASWAN believes this case is stronger in merit than the case in Miami. The effect of these flagrant local zoning laws may cost lives, harbor prejudices, exploit those who are homeless and experiencing awakening nightmare with very little hope in sight for opportunities to alleviate their plight. Richmond went even farther than Miami in regards that City of Richmond pass laws to ban shelters and services by-right in the entire city limits, and attempted to force a zoning law on all Richmond churches claiming that they can't feed more than thirty homeless people seven times a year. In addition, over the last several years, at least ten times as many homeless people are being harassed and arrested by VCU police, some of the homeless were merely passing through to another destination.

In April of 1997, the city mailed Rev. Eddie Perry, an ASWAN advisory member, April 28 as the date of City Council voting on the proposed zoning ordinances and advertised in the newspaper that the same public hearing would be heard and voted on April 14. ASWAN filed suit against the city May 16, 1997 and on May 19, Judge Markow approved ASWAN's request of an emergency injunction (first time in VA history a judge intervened on a zoning ordinances before it became law). He ordered Richmond Planning Commission not to vote on the related zoning proposals, just one hour before that vote were to take place. Immediately after the Judge ruling the city began a reintroduction process of the new ordinances with new numbers but with identical language and ASWAN later failed to get another grant of relief, the flagrant zoning ordinances became law on July 28, 1997.

On September 5, 1997, the City attorney office filed a demurrer claiming the following: "ASWAN has no standing to assert the rights of provider of homeless services, and further has no justiciable interest in this matter as it has none of the "vested rights..." At October 9, 1997 hearing, city attorneys argued " In order to have a justiciable interest in the controversy, a plaintiff must demonstrate that plaintiff's rights are going to be affected by the outcome of this case.... ASWAN does not provide any services. It does not provide any feeding programs. It does not have any facilities. It does not own any property. It is not going to have to pay any fees....'

ASWAN attorney responded the following: 'The fact that associations can sue on behalf of their members and where it is consistent with the purpose of the association has been recognized as a general rule in the law... their {city's} argument is: Since the homeless don't own land, they don't have standing... In fact, one of these ordinances says these churches downtown by right and throughout the area can't feed more than thirty homeless people seven times a year. It is directed directly at the homeless... It turns equity and law on its head and upside down, that the homeless do not have standing to object to the procedures used enact an ordinance which is on its face directed at them to reduce the rights that they have...'

On November 18, 1997, the VA Supreme Court ruled in favor of the city "solely on the basis of standing." On December 4, 1997, ASWAN file papers for reconsideration and leave to amend, which was denied but noted ASWAN's objection on December 10, 1997.

ASWAN contended throughout the litigation, that a large majority of its members are homeless or formerly homeless with voting rights while other representatives of the community are considered advisers and non-voting members during its meeting. They petitioned their grievances to local government before the controversial ordinances became law and contested the ordinances at every stage.

The homeless community in Miami took over abandoned buildings and parks due to the lack of assistance and shelter in that city, the police responded by locking up many of the homeless people involved.

The 1992 lawsuit charged that the City's policy was to arrest and harass involuntarily homeless residents of Miami, based on little more than their public presence, for the purpose of driving them out of the city or otherwise rendering them invisible. The case tried before Federal District Judge C. Clyde Atkins who found that the City of Miami's mistreatment of homeless persons violated various provisions of the Bill of Rights and ordered that the city establish two "safe zones" where homeless persons could congregate and conduct essential, life-sustaining activities-(sleeping, sitting, standing, eating, etc.) without fear of arrest or police harassment.

The City appealed the ruling to the 11th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in Atlanta that sent the case back to Judge Atkins for a determination whether, based on projects undertaken by the Dade County Community Homeless Trust to assist homeless persons, circumstances had changed to render the court's injunction unnecessary.

Following another extensive hearing in 1994, Judge Atkins concluded that, while the Homeless Trust's programs had certainly improved conditions for homeless persons in Dade County, there were still involuntarily homeless persons living on the streets who were being arrested based on nothing more than their homeless status.

The city appealed this ruling to the 11th Circuit Court where a mediator directed the parties to negotiate a settlement. When it was all said and done, Miami created a multimillion trust fund to establish new homeless programs and shelters and paid millions in attorney's fees. Added Police training regarding the circumstances and rights of homeless people. A protocol for law enforcement exchange with homeless persons that ensures that people without shelter cannot be arrested for merely living in public. The creation and maintenance of records regarding police exchange with homeless persons. An advisory committee to monitor compliance with the Agreement. A $600,000 compensation fund for homeless persons who were injured by Miami's unconstitutional conduct which was condemned by federal courts.

This is a landmark settlement recognizing that homeless persons cannot be denied fundamental constitutional rights simply because they are homeless, said cooperating ACLU attorney Benjamin S. Waxman. The settlement reached today {December 18, 1997} shows the best of what can be accomplished when two sides of a dispute work together to find common ground to accomplish a mutual goal, and may serve as a model for how other cities treat the homeless," Waxman added.